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Tax Reform:
SHOULD WE CAP PROPERTY TAXES OR
 HANG OUR HATS ON OTHER OPTIONS?
BY STEVEN P. LANZA
In the name of property tax reform, 
Governor Rell is again pushing a pro-
posal, shelved last year, that would 
after a period of transition limit most 
local property tax growth to 3%. No 
question, Nutmeggers labor under a 
heavy property tax load. Connecticut 
ranks 2nd among U.S. states in prop-
erty taxes per capita, 4th in such 
taxes as a percent of income, and 
10th as a percent of home value.  And 
with the growth in local property taxes 
outstripping inflation in recent years, 
our rankings could worsen.  Even so, 
capping the growth in local property 
taxes is no guarantee that taxpayers’ 
burdens will ease.  Nor does it seem 
to have the sort of efficiency gains 
that might translate into improved 
public sector performance.
TAXING ISSUES
  The property tax is the corner-
stone of local government finance.   
According to the Tax Foundation, a 
Washington-based policy research orga-
nization, property taxes provide about 
28% of total local government revenue 
in the U.S. and nearly three-quarters 
of towns’ own tax collections.  Grants 
from state and federal governments 
(39%) and user fees and other non-tax 
charges (23%) make up the balance.   
In Connecticut, property taxes are the 
sole source of local tax revenue, and 
non-tax user fees contribute less than 
10% to the total.
  The activities of local government 
run the gamut: from parks and rec-
reation to public safety and trans-
portation.  But elementary and sec-
ondary education command the lion’s 
share of local public monies both in 
Connecticut, where it accounts for 
more than half of local budgets, and 
across the nation.
 Local government expenditures 
have swelled of late.  In the latest ten 
year period (1995-2005) for which the 
U.S. Census of Governments has pub-
lished data, local government spend-
ing climbed 73% in the U.S., and by 
59% in Connecticut. Faster population 
growth nationally accounts for virtually 
all of the differential change in spend-
ing.  On a per-capita basis, local spend-
ing (and local property taxes) increased 
by about 50% in both the U.S. and the 
state, during a period when the price 
level rose less than 30%.
  So even after accounting for popu-
lation and price-level increases, local 
spending and taxes have gone up by 
approximately 20% (50% - 30%) in 
the last ten years.  What gives?  
For one thing, many local govern-
ment services—public parks, for exam-
ple—are (in economics-speak) normal 
goods: items that people demand in 
larger quantities as their incomes go 
up.  Translation: the richer people are, 
the more local government services 
they crave.  
 Another source of the problem 
is the dreaded unfunded mandate.   
Higher levels of government often 
require localities to provide services, 
like special education, without neces-
sarily writing checks big enough to 
cover the added costs.  What’s more, 
the price of those services, which are by 
definition labor-intensive, has increased 
faster than the overall price level in 
recent years.  The price of education 
services, for example, has increased 
more than 2.5 times faster than the rate 
of prices overall in the past decade.  
  And though the share of local rev-
enue from federal and state grants has 
Capping the growth in 
local property taxes is no 
guarantee that taxpayers’ 
burdens will ease.   
Nor does it seem to have 
the sort of efficiency gains 
that might translate into 
improved public sector 
performance.SPRING 2008  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  7 
held steady in the past ten years, that 
fixed share of support hasn’t obviated 
the need for localities to increase taxes 
on a par with the increases in spending. 
The subsequent jump in tax bills is giv-
ing property tax payers sticker shock 
and prompting calls for reform, and 
not just in Connecticut.
  Property tax restrictions on local 
governments are nothing new—they’ve 
been around since the late nineteenth 
century.  In modern times, the grand-
daddy of the property tax reform 
movement was California’s Proposition 
13, championed by the irascible 74-
year old Howard Jarvis.  Saddled with 
soaring tax bills, and armed with the 
power of the referendum, California 
citizens voted 2 to 1 in 1978 to limit 
property taxes to 1% of market value 
and restrict tax increases to no more 
than 2% per year.  
  Massachusetts weighed in with its 
own version of property tax reform two 
years later, when it passed Proposition 
2½.  Unlike California, which limited 
tax rates, Massachusetts capped prop-
erty tax levies, limiting the amount of 
total revenue that localities could raise 
using property taxes.  Governor Rell’s 
proposal hews more closely to the 
Massachusetts than to the California 
approach.  (See the centerfold for 
a map showing the recent growth 
in property taxes across Connecticut 
towns.)
PROMISES, PROMISES
  Advocates of property tax limita-
tions claim that such restrictions can 
reduce local residents’ tax bills with-
out compromising the quality of local 
services.  The implicit assumption (or 
explicit assertion) is that waste and 
inefficiency are driving up the cost 
of public services and that a tax cap 
can impose the kind of discipline on 
municipalities that they seem unwill-
ing to impose on themselves.
 Opponents insist that no level 
of government faces more competi-
tive discipline than does local govern-
ment.  Residents unhappy with the 
mix of public services and taxes need 
only “vote with their feet” and move 
to another municipality with a more 
attractive combination of taxes and ser-
vices.  That dynamic forces local gov-
ernments to be efficient and responsive 
to residents’ needs.  In this view, the 
high cost of local government has less 
to do with waste and inefficiency, and 
more to do with increases in the cost of 
health care, other benefits, and wages, 
which are driving up expenses in all 
sectors of the economy.
  Empirical evidence seems to sug-
gest that opponents of tax limitations 
have the stronger case.  
REALITY CHECK
  First, there is little evidence that 
tax caps do much to constrain property 
taxes, all things considered.  In 2006, 
property taxes on owner-occupied 
housing by state ranged from a low of 
0.4% of median income in Louisiana 
to a high of just over 7% in New Jersey.   
And in that year 29 states had property 
tax levy limits of the sort Governor Rell 
proposes.  But my regression analysis 
shows no statistically significant nega-
tive link between tax caps and property 
tax liability across states.  The model, 
which controls for other factors that 
may explain the property tax burden 
of individual taxpayers, explains nearly 
60% of the variation in the data (see 
table, overleaf). 
  Two such “other factors” are the 
size of the population and the incomes 
of area residents.  Property taxes are 
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median incomes.  Larger populations 
and wealthier residents tend to demand 
more public services and accept higher 
taxes as the unavoidable consequence of 
this preference.  A ten-percent increase 
in population is associated with a 1/10 
of a point increase in taxes as a per-
cent of income; a $10,000 increase 
in median income produces an 8/10 
point increase.
 Taxes also vary positively with 
the quality of local services.  Keeping 
pupil-teacher ratios low, for instance, 
may be one way to provide a more 
enriching classroom experience, but 
doing that takes money.  As expected, 
taxes are higher where pupil-teacher 
ratios are lower.  Reducing the num-
ber of students in a classroom by one 
increases taxes as a percent of income 
by about 1/10 of a percentage point.
  Taxes also depend on the ability of 
local governments to generate revenue 
from other sources.  Grants from the 
state or federal level make localities less 
reliant on local sources of funding.  My 
model suggests that a 10 percentage-
point increase in the share of revenue 
from outside sources lowers taxes as a 
percent of income by 2/10 percentage 
points.  And where localities have the 
option to raise revenue through other 
tax mechanisms, property taxes also 
tend to be lower.  A one percentage-
point increase in the share of revenue 
earned through a local sales tax or 
income tax reduces property taxes as 
a percent of income by 1/10 of a per-
centage point.
  After controlling for these factors, 
the regression model shows no statisti-
cal relationship between tax caps and 
property taxes.  Capping taxes does 
not reduce the share of income that 
residents are required to pay their 
local governments—just the opposite 
of what proponents of caps might hope 
for. 
 On the basis of this model, 
Connecticut’s actual tax burden is 
about what one might predict.  Given 
Connecticut’s characteristics, the 
regression implies that Nutmeggers 
should pay 5.2% of their incomes 
in property taxes; we actually fork 
over 5.1%.  Paying taxes in line with 
expectations would seem to be meager 
kindling for a taxpayers’ revolt.
WHAT EFFICIENCY GAINS?
  If tax caps reduced government 
waste and inefficiency, states with caps 
should have better-quality public ser-
vices than those that do not, other 
things equal. Do they?  Let’s focus on 
education since it is the primary obli-
gation of local government.  
 To gauge (however imperfectly) 
the educational proficiency of school-
children, every state administers the 
National Assessment of Education 
Progress (NAEP) to all 4th and 8th 
graders. Educational research has long 
recognized that societal characteris-
tics such as race and the educational 
attainment of the adult population are 
important determinants of student test 
scores.  Non-minority students and 
children of parents with college and 
advanced degrees routinely perform 
better on standardized tests. 
  Sure enough, a regression of state 
level data for 2006 shows that half 
the variation in scores on the NAEP 
can be explained by two variables: the 
percentage of the population that is 
black, and the percentage of the adult 
population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree (see table). 
 We’d like to think that scores 
would depend on the quality of the 
educational system, too.  And the evi-
dence does suggest that NAEP scores 
tend to be higher where per-pupil 
spending is higher, though the link is 
far less statistically significant.  
 More efficient school systems 
should, using the same resources, 
produce better test results. But after 
controlling for social conditions and 
resources devoted to education, school-
children in states with tax caps perform 
no better than kids in states without 
caps.  So tax caps do not have a statis-
tically significant affect on educational 
proficiency, at least as measured by the 
NAEP.
  That’s bad news for tax cap advo-
cates, who have trumpeted the effi-
ciency gains of such a system. But the 
fears of tax cap opponents haven’t been 
realized, either. Tax caps don’t seem to 
have wreaked wholesale havoc on the 
nation’s educational system.
  How does Connecticut perform 
according to the regression results?   
Again, about as expected.  Test scores 
for the state’s 4th graders were slightly 
above the level predicted by this simple 
model, while scores for 8th graders 
were a bit lower than predicted.
Dependent Variable: 
Percentage Point Change
in Property Taxes as




+ 1/10 Population + 10%
+ 8/10 Median Income +10,000
+ 1/10 Students per Teacher - 1-student
- 2/10 Outside Revenue +10%
- 1/10 Non-Property Taxes + 1-point
No change Tax Caps
Dependent Variable: 
Percent Change 




+ 5/10 Adults with B.A + 10%
- 1/10 Black Population + 10%
+ 3/10 Per-Pupil Spending + 10%
No change Tax Caps
EXPLAINING THE VARIATION IN PROPERTY TAXES AND STUDENT TEST SCORES ACROSS STATES
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OTHER OPTIONS
  These results won’t surprise many 
economists.  Most of us dismal scien-
tists would expect a tax cap, at worst, to 
reduce the quantity or quality of public 
services, though it need not have any 
effect at all.  Think of rent controls—a 
cap on the rental price of property. A 
ceiling below the market price leads to 
non-price rationing (queueing) and 
a deterioration in housing quality as 
landlords neglect routine maintenance 
and improvements—costs they are 
unable to recoup.  But a ceiling above 
the going market price changes noth-
ing: the market is free to clear below 
the maximum price.  
 What may be salvaging educa-
tional quality in states with tax caps 
is the weak link between spending 
and performance to begin with, com-
bined with provisions allowing voters 
to override the restrictions.  Still, such 
artificial restrictions and the associated 
escape clauses seem as awkward as they 
are ineffective.
  Are there more sensible ways of 
controlling local property taxes?  The 
first regression above suggests one pos-
sibility.  In states where local govern-
ments levy separate sales or income 
taxes, property taxes are lower.  So why 
don’t Connecticut municipalities, espe-
cially those drawing the most fire for 
high property taxes, experiment with 
other tax mechanisms?  Then citizens, 
by their ballots or choice of residence, 
could opt for the mix of taxes and ser-
vices they liked best.  
In Connecticut, though, state law 
stands in the way.  Under “Dillon’s 
Rule,” an opinion articulated by a New 
Mexico state supreme court judge and 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1907, localities have only the pow-
ers expressly granted to them by their 
states.  To have the option of substitut-
ing other taxes for the property tax, 
Connecticut towns would need the 
approval of the General Assembly and 
the governor.
A MODEST PROPOSAL
  While weighing changes to the 
taxing powers of cash-strapped local 
governments, the state might also con-
sider granting localities, particularly 
cities, the option of taxing land and 
improvements at differential rates—a 
version of the so-called land-value tax 
popularized by the 18th-century politi-
cal economist Henry George.
  One problem with property taxes, 
and ironically with caps on property tax 
growth, is that they promote suburban 
and exurban sprawl.  Towns have the 
incentive to restrict the development of 
family-friendly housing since families 
whose kids need educational services 
often add more to the demand for local 
services than they do to the tax base.   
Instead, towns authorize construction 
of strip malls and big-box stores that 
expand the tax base but don’t sap local 
services.  A tax cap that prevented 
towns from raising taxes to compensate 
for the cost of necessary services would 
likely aggravate the problem, and lead 
to more strip malls and big box stores 
in the countryside.
  But taxing land at a higher rate 
than improvements (e.g. buildings) 
changes the incentives.  Vacant and 
abandoned parcels in central cities and 
older suburbs, in the heart of popula-
tion and work centers, would become 
relatively more attractive to developers 
than raw land on the urban periph-
ery.  And developers would have the 
incentive to economize on the use of 
land, building up rather than out.  In 
the parlance of economics, land-value 
taxation promotes development on the 
intensive rather than extensive margin.
  Land-value taxation would prob-
ably not reverse a century-long trend 
of suburban spread, fueled by the 
automobile and the interstate.  But it 
could be an important weapon in the 
economic development arsenal, and 
particularly valuable in helping the 
state’s central cities begin to erase years 
of blight and neglect.
Land value taxation 
could be an important 
weapon in the economic 
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helping the state’s central 
cities begin to erase years 
of blight and neglect.